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1Abstract
This article examines current high levels of violent conflict in Plateau State in central 
Nigeria using an economic property-rights analysis that draws on the work of Harold 
Demsetz, Robert Cooter, Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney.  
The thesis of the article is that this wide-spread violent conflict over resource use/access 
is tied, in important ways, to the passage of federal legislation in Nigeria that nationalized 
land.  This legislation, I contend, blocked the continued evolution of customary land-law 
norms that had evolved to meet a variety of land-use needs and that had a relatively low-
cost and transparent indigenous dispute resolution mechanism.  
The new institutional environment is beset by problems associated with very high levels
of official corruption that make enforcing the law difficult.  More importantly though, the 
legislation itself blocks the evolution of land law so that outright sale (which was 
occurring under customary law) is now prohibited. This change means that individuals 
are forced to rely on corrupt government officials to allocate an increasingly scarce 
resource.  Because the official channels for allocation are perceived as corrupt and 
because the government often does not enforce property rights, individuals might be 
resorting to costly private enforcement in a desperate effort to gains rights over valuable 
land.
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3Blocking Legal Evolution and Paying the Price:
Property and Conflict in the Nigerian Highlands
Karol C. Boudreaux*
Introduction
“The fundamental purpose of property rights, and their fundamental accomplishment, is 
that they eliminate destructive competition for control of economic resources. Well-
defined and well-protected property rights replace competition by violence with 
competition by peaceful means.”1
Three years:  53,000 people dead; thousands of homes destroyed; tens of thousands of 
men, women, and children displaced.2  These terrible statistics are not the toll taken in a 
traditional war between nations.  Nor are they the results of a civil war.  Rather, these
grim figures represent the outcome of a particular kind of conflict that surfaces all-too 
often in Africa and throughout the developing world:  a bloody battle over the use and 
control of resources, a battle that ultimately is about property rights.
Between 2001 and 2004, the people of the central Nigerian state of Plateau suffered a 
series of deadly riots that led to the declaration of a state of emergency.3   What caused 
these riots?  A peace conference conducted by the government blames the violence on
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1
 Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html.
2 Nigeria – Plateau State Violence Claimed 53,000 Lives – Report, IRIN NEWS.ORG, Friday, October 8, 
2004 available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43580.
3
 The state of emergency is now ended.  For the text of the Declaration see, 
http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/FedGovt/Federalism/emergency_rule/plateau_obasanjo.html.  For 
reporting on the event.  See Nigeria:  Obasanjo declares state of emergency in Plateau State, available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040518-irin02.htm.
4disputes over property -- disputes that were, undoubtedly, exacerbated by ethnic and 
religious conflicts.4   The scope of this killing is shocking and leads one to ask, “What 
has happened in Nigeria to drive people to settle land disputes by means of violence 
rather than by use of peaceful judicial, administrative, or customary mechanisms?”
This paper considers possible answers to these difficult questions, focusing on two issues:  
the evolution of legal norms in response to both endogenous and exogenous changes, and 
the role that African customary law and indigenous dispute resolution played in 
promoting coordination and cooperation among group members, and thereby reducing 
violent conflict.  The paper considers whether the continued evolution of relatively elastic 
customary legal norms was impeded by legislative action of the federal government of 
Nigeria.  Property norms under customary law were flexible enough to provide a wide 
variety of property rights and allow for the peaceful trading and reasonable protection of 
those rights, all at relatively low cost .  In addition, accessible indigenous dispute 
resolution  mechanisms provided access to leaders with substantial local knowledge of 
property rights arrangements.  Further, the paper examines one element of the customary 
land law – rules for dealing with strangers – and considers how these provisions reduced 
transactions costs and aligned expectations about property norms.   
Formal de jure rules governing property law were changed in 1978 by a federal statute 
that imposes a costlier, less flexible formalized and centralized approach to land-use 
issues. This paper suggests that legislation, coupled with significant enforcement 
problems, might be responsible for some of the violence in Plateau. Examining ways in 
4 Nigeria – Plateau State Violence, supra note 2. 
5which the property-right environment has changed may provide insight into the sources 
of the violence plaguing the Nigerian highlands in Plateau State.5
The Outlines of the Crisis
Consider Yelwa. On May 2nd, 2004 in this small town in Plateau State, a group of 
Christian Taroks, carrying guns and machetes, attacked and murdered over 600 Fulani 
Muslims.6  The attack was meant to avenge a Fulani massacre of 50 Taroks that had 
taken place inside a church in February 2004, which, in turn, was a reprisal for earlier 
attacks by Christians of Fulanis.  The attacks devastated the town and the region.  One 
reporter noted that:  “Churches and mosques were razed.  Neighbor turned against 
neighbor.  Reprisal attacks spread until finally, in mid-May, the government imposed 
emergency rule.”7   While ethnic and religious conflicts partially explain the vicious 
confrontations, at heart, this massacre seems to have been about land.  New York Times
reporter Somini Sengupta wrote:  
“Before there were mass graves here, there was the matter of cows and corn 
patches.  Some years ago . . . farmers accused cattle herders of deliberately 
sending their long-horned beasts to trample across their plots.  Cattle herders 
accused farmers of deliberately setting their grassy meadows on fire to keep their 
animals from grazing.”  
5
 The official motto of Plateau state is the “Home of Peace and Tourism.” See Thatcher’s Website available 
at: http://www.thachers.org/Oct%202001%20files/oct_2001.htm.  This personal web site, run by an  
American doctor and missionary in Nigieria, also shows photos of the aftermath of the Jos riots. 
6Nigeria:  Prevent Further Bloodshed in Plateau State, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/11/nigeri8568_txt.htm.
7
 Somini Sengupta, Letter from Africa; Where the Land Is a Tinderbox, the Killing Is a Frenzy, NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 16, 2004. 
6Other observers agree.  Human Rights Watch characterized the massacre as “a prolonged 
conflict over land use as well as political and economic control.”8  Discussing the 
conflict in Yelwa, Alex Vines of the Royal Institute of African Affairs argued that it was, 
at heart, a contest over land.9   Sengupta observed:  “In recent years, as the desert has 
spread, trees have been felled and the populations of both herders and farmers have 
soared, the competition for land has only intensified.”10   Mark Doyle of the BBC echoed 
this insight: 
While there is great wealth at the top of Nigerian society . . .there is also great 
poverty and some of the violence reflects a struggle for resources and survival. 
This is particularly the case in rural areas along a belt of territory across the centre 
of the country, including Plateau State, where farmers are in competition for land 
and resources with herders. In areas where farmers are predominantly settled 
Christians and where cattle herders, originally from further north, are mainly 
Muslim, an impression can be created of 'religious' or 'ethnic' tension. But in 
reality the root causes of the violence are political and economic - a competition 
for fertile land.11
If the inhabitants of Yelwa, and of Plateau state more generally, are competing for a 
scarce resource – land -- in an increasingly heterogeneous environment, 12  economic 
8 Nigeria:  Prevent Further Bloodshed, supra note 6. 
9
 Sengupta, supra note 7. 
10 Id.  For a discussion of the relationship between property rights and migratory herding, see TOM 
BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH, 239-242 (1998).
11
 Mark Doyle, Poverty behind Nigeria’s violence, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, May 19, 2004 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3730109.stm.   The same sentiment is found in a report by EDC News: 
“`It is more a matter of the natives fearing their land was being taken over and deciding to fight for it,’ says
one local expert.  The Sahara Desert is steadily advancing southwards, forcing many farming and grazing 
communities in the Nigeria’s [sic] far-north to move south in search of greener pastures.  Their arrival in 
central Nigeria has increased pressure on the land.  Many indigenous communities in the Middle Belt have 
been afraid that they will lose out to the newcomers.”  See, Conflict in northern Nigeria more about land 
and livelihoods than religion, EDC NEWS, ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES, Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency available at 
http://www.edcnews.se/Cases/NigeriaYelwa2004.html.
12
“ The population in northern Nigeria grew from approximately 16.8 million in 1952 (the date of a reliable 
census taken by the British) to approximately 47.3 million in 1991 (the date of the last reliable census by 
the independent government).  This growth represents an annual increase of 2.61% per annum, though in 
7theory predicts that they would seek to create and enforce more individualized rights to 
land in order to internalize externalities caused by these changes. They would seek these 
rights in order to allocate the resource more efficiently and to restrict entry to better 
capture the increasing value of land.13 Unfortunately, the legislative solution to land-use 
and land-allocation issues in today’s Nigeria -- the Land Use Act of 197814 -- creates a 
rigid legal environment that limits internalization efforts by prohibit ing the sale of land,
restricting permissible lot sizes, and requiring government permission to lend or lease 
property.15  Such rigidity contrasts with the relatively elastic customary law in Plateau, 
which provided a rich array of mechanisms to manage changes in market value and 
technology – including even the sale of land.16
some regions, such as Plateau State and Niger State increases have been more substantial – 3.5% in Plateau 
per annum and 3.12% in Niger.  Sustained droughts in the far northeast of Nigeria are partially responsible 
for the increase of population in the more humid areas of Plateau and Niger.”  See Werner Fricke, Factors 
Governing the Regional Populations Development in NE-Nigeria, in PERSISTENCE AND TRANSFORMATION 
BETWEEN CHAD BASIN AND BENUE 13, available at http://www.rzuser.uni-
heidelberg.de/~bu1/sfb/d1/Session_fricke_www_ symp99_2.html.  The Annual Abstract of Statistics of 
Nigeria lists the 1991 population of Plateau state at 3,312,412.  The projected population for 1998 was 
4,627,043.  See ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Office of 
Statistics, Table 12 at 26 and Table 13 at 27 (1999).
13In his seminal work, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Harold Demsetz argues:  “[P]roperty rights 
develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of 
internalization.  Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values. . . changes 
to which old property rights are poorly attuned.” 57 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, No. 2, 350 (May, 
1967).  He goes on to discuss the ways in which Montagnes Indians developed property rights in hunting 
grounds in response to increases in the value of fur-bearing animals.  Id. at  351-354.  See also, Eirik G. 
Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory:  A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE,  Issue 4, 1141 (Dec. 1972), and Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, 
The Evolution of Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:  COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, 126 (2003).
14Federal Republic of Nigeria, Decree #6, Land Use Act (Lagos, 1978).  Shortly before the Land Use Act 
was implemented in 1978, 34,656.1hectare of land in the Benue/Plateau state was “purchased,” which is 
defined as “bought for cash” by official Nigerian government documentation.  In 1967 Benue and Plateau 
were merged, they have since been separated.  See, RURAL ECONOMIC SURVEY, Report on Land Tenure 
Equiries, 1976/1977 – 1978/79, Federal Office of Statistics, Agricultural Survey Unit, Lagos, June, 1989 at 
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.  In 1977/78 this number had, for Plateau alone, fallen to 7,602 and in 1978/79 the 
number was 243 or 0.12 percent of the land in Plateau state.  The Land Use Act prohibits such sales. 
15 Land Use Act, supra note 14 at § ____. 
16
 Discussing the customary land law of Papua New Guinea, Robert Cooter writes:  “[M]y general view (is) 
that customary law is living law, which changes and develops according to the wishes of the people who 
are subject to it.”  Robert Cooter, ISSUES IN CUSTOMARY LAND LAW, 4 (Institute of National Affairs 1989) 
available at:  http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/.  The customary land law of Nigeria changed as well, 
responding to differing needs and constraints.  See discussion infra, at 36 to 45.
8Complicating this situation is the Nigerian government’s inability, or unwillingness, to 
effectively mediate conflicts:  “In the latest incident, police and army reinforcements 
were only sent to Yelwa after hundreds of people had already been killed.”17 President 
Obasanjo, in his Declaration of May 18th, 2004 stated:
As at [sic] today, there is nothing on ground and no evidence whatsoever to show 
that the State Governor has the interest, desire, commitment, credibility and 
capacity to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, forgiveness, peace, harmony 
and stability. If anything, some of his utterances, his lackadaisical attitude and 
seeming uneven-handedness over the salient and contending issues present him as 
not just part of the problem, but also as an instigator and a threat to peace. Plateau 
State cannot and must not experience another spate of violence, killings and 
destruction of property. If allowed, the crisis will engulf the entire nation.18
In situations where resources are highly valued and where the number of competitors for 
the resource is both large and heterogeneous, it is normally assumed that formal 
governance structures are needed both to define and enforce rights.19 In the case of 
property disputes in Nigeria’s highlands, however, formal governance structures designed 
to manage such disputes are corrupt, costly and/or non-existent.20
17Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed, supra note 6; see also Nigeria:  Jos – A City Torn Apart, available 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nigeria/nigeria1201-02.htm#P107_10073.   There is evidence that 
government officials knew in March that reprisals on the citizens of Yelwa where planned in response to 
the February killings.  Despite assurances that the government would “deal decisively” with the any 
plotters, little was actually done to prevent the bloodshed.  See, Nigeria:  2,500 displaced in Plateau State 
violence, says Red Cross, available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/60dd46cd396516f285256e4d0076eb95?.
18Declaration of Emergency Rule in Plateau State of Nigeria, available at 
http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/FedGovt/Federalism/emergency_rule/plateau_obasanjo.html
19
 Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:  COOPERATION, CONFLICT, 
AND LAW, 145 (Princeton University Press 2003) who notes that in such a situation, “the power of the state 
usually is necessary to supplement informal constraints on access and use.”   In Nigeria, the state fails to 
provide such supplemental support.  
20
 In 2004, Nigeria placed next to last in a score of perception of corruption within the state.  See Nigeria
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003 225 (2004) available at 
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2004/11_Country_reports_L_Z.pdf
9This corruption and costliness traps the people of Plateau state between the proverbial 
rock and hard place.  If land values in Plateau are rising due to increased demand, this 
should lead to a gradual movement away from the traditional communal property regime ,
towards greater individualization of tenure.21  However, the Land Use Act blocks this 
evolutionary move by prohibiting land sales and by encumbering other permitted
transfers with significant bureaucratic obstacles.22   This legislatively imposed me thod 
for allocating land is widely believed to be corrupt.23  The new system replaces evolved 
indigenous dispute resolutions mechanisms with a costlier bureaucratized dispute-
resolution system.  And finally, as President Obasanjo claims, the process for enforcing 
these new property rights often simply fails to function.  Thus, the people of Plateau may 
be left to take “justice” into their own hands, as the federal government imposes an ill-
fitting legislative solution on land-tenure issues that the state government fails to enforce, 
resulting in an anarchical environment.24
21
 Demsetz, supra note 13 at 350.  In situations where property values increase, competition for control of 
the resource often increases.   For discussions of increased conflict over land as a result of increases in 
value see, Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap and Bernardo Mueller, TITLES, CONFLICT AND LAND USE, 
(1999), who discuss episodes of violence in the Brazilian rain forest in response increasing demand for 
land; see also, Gershon Feder and David Feeny, Land Tenure and Property Rights:  Theory and 
Implications for Development Policy, 5 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, No. 1, 138-39 (January, 
1991), discussing the conflict levels in Thailand in the late 19th century in response to rising land value.
22
 Changes in the value of land in Plateau state, and the desire of individuals to capture this increased value, 
may be leading people to band together to better block entry by  non-group members. If there is strength in 
numbers, dissatisfaction with the current land system in Plateau state may be causing people to group 
together to fight off threats to their property claims.  This destructive collective action may represent a 
response to an unproductive de jure system and an attempt to adjust the de facto property rights in the 
absence of effective government action.  See Gary D. Libecap, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16
(1989) who says:  “For example, an increase in relative prices or a fall in production costs will raise the 
stream of rents attainable from ownership and encourage new competition for control.  Old enforcement 
mechanisms may no longer be adequate, leading to rent dissipation as inputs are diverted from production 
to protect against trespass and theft.  .  .   Capturing a portion of any rents that can be saved by more 
precisely defining property rights motivates individuals to organize for collective action to adjust property 
institutions from their current state to the new conditions.” 
23 See discussion infra at 47-52.
24
 For an economic analysis of the decision-making process involved in determining when to negotiate 
property rights claims and when to fight over conflicting claims see generally Terry L. Anderson and Fred 
10
Unfortunately, Yelwa is not an isolated incident.  Major riots occurred in the northern 
Plateau city of Jos in 2001.25 In 2002, Fulanis attacked Tarok people in Wase in southern 
Plateau, in March, 2003 another Tarok settlement was attacked resulting in over 80 
deaths, and in June 2003, over 500 people were killed.26 Reprisals followed the Yelwa 
massacre.27 The Jos riots, while attributed to discontent over a political appointment,
were likely exacerbated by insecure property rights, which made it difficult to effectively 
absorb large numbers of internally displaced Nigerians.  Human Rights Watch notes: 
many people fleeing conflicts in their own areas had sought protection and safety 
in Jos; some had even settled there. Some observers believe that this regular 
influx of populations from neighboring states may have ended up destabilizing the 
tranquility of Jos. People fleeing in 2000 and 2001 from clashes in Kaduna, 
Bauchi, Taraba, and Nasarawa states may have inadvertently contributed to 
creating an atmosphere of fear among inhabitants of Plateau State by testifying to 
the atrocities they had left behind, some of which were still continuing. The 
increase in the population in Jos, in particular, also created an increase in 
economic pressures, leading in turn to the scarcity of some goods and increase in 
prices. Resources became stretched, and tensions began to rise.28
Since 1999, a number of other northern and middle belt states in Nigeria have
experienced repeated episodes of violence.29  Violence escalated following the election of 
S. McChesney Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations 37 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 39-74 (1994).
25 See Nigeria:  Jos - A City Torn Apart, supra note 17.  See also, 20 dead in fresh Plateau violence despite 
state of emergency, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040520-
irin02.htm
26Plateau State:  Communal Conflicts in Wase (Southern Plateau) and Berom area (Northern Plateau) 
IDASA, SPECIAL TOPIC, WEEKELY UPDATE available at:  
http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FRID%3D193%26TID%3D11%26OTID%3
D2. 
27 See 20 dead in fresh Plateau violence, supra note 24.
28See, Nigeria:  Jos – A City Torn Apart, supra note 17. 
29See, Nigeria, 2,500 displaced in Plateau State violence, supra note 17.   The 1980s and 1990s have been 
described as particularly repressive in Nigeria.  See, Abdul-Ganiyu Garba and P. Kassey Garba Open 
Conflicts when State, Institution and Market fail:  The case of Nigeria  37 unpublished manuscript available 
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the civilian government of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, and particularly after the 
reintroduction of sharia law in criminal cases in 12 northern Nigeria states, beginning in 
2000.30 During the intervening years, thousands have been killed and, as noted, in 2004 
President Obasanjo declared a state of emergency in the Plateau state.31
These conflicts are typically characterized as struggles between ethnic and religious 
factions.32  Nigeria is extraordinarily diverse, composed of over 250 ethnic groups.33
Plateau State alone has 54 different ethnic groups.34 Some of these groups have conflicts 
related to political rivalries, some related to religious differences, and some related to 
access to resources. The Yelwa massacre is an example of the latter.35
from Department of Economics, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria and on file with author.  The 
recent rise in the incidence of violence may be tied to the election of a civilian leader.  Under a military 
dictatorship, discord and attendant violence might be more effectively suppressed, whereas under civilian 
rule it might prove more difficult to suppress discord and violent conflict.  Nigeria elected President 
Obasanjo in 1999.  The country was ruled by military dictators from 1983 to 1999.   
30 Sharia, or Islamic, criminal law was introduced in the northern state of Zamfara in January, 2000.  Sharia
had been outlawed after Nigeria’s independence in 1960.   Since its reintroduction in 2000, 12 states have 
adopted sharia. See, John Paden, Islam and Democratic Federalism in Nigeria, AFRICA NOTES, No. 8, 
March, 2002, p. 1, Center for Strategic and International Studies.   In Nigeria, sharia is applied is applied to 
Muslims only in both civil and criminal cases.  However, actions of vigilante groups, who “watch” for 
sharia violations, have resulted in non-Muslims to feel increasingly intimidated and, in some cases, in 
attacks against non-Muslims.  See Nigeria’s Sharia Split, BBC NEWS, October 15, 2001 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1600804.stm.   
31David Cowan (ed.) Nigeria Country Report, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT  7 (August, 2004),  
available at www.eiu.com. Subscription service. 
32 See Gilbert Da Costa, Resurgence in violence kills hundreds in Nigeria, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
PORTSMOUTH HERALD, August 23, 1999 available at 
http://www.seacoastonline.com/1999news/8_23_w2.htm.
33 See Nigeria, CIA—THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html. 
34 See, Funmi Peter Omale, Implementation Committee for Peace Confab Inaugurated, THIS DAY (Lagos), 
Friday, October 8, 2004 available  at http://allafrica.com/stories/200410080379.html. 
35Nigeria:  Muslim death toll in raid on Yelwa tops 600 – Red Cross, IRINNEWS.ORG available at
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?/ReportID=40952&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectC  May 7, 2004.  See 
also Tom Ashby, More than 100 Dead, 1,000 Wounded in Nigeria Feud, REUTERS NEWS, Friday, April 
30, 2004 available at http:www.reuters.com/newsArticle.
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The country is not only divided along ethnic lines, it is also divided along religious lines:  
approximately 50% of the population is Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% adhere to 
indigenous animist beliefs.36   Of the 36 states in the Nigerian federation, the 19 northern 
states are predominately Muslim, while the 17 southern states are predominately 
Christian.37
The heterogeneity of Nigerian society makes for a potentially explosive mix.  Since its 
independence from British colonial rule in 1960, political power in Nigeria has shifted 
back and forth between representatives of different ethnic, regional, and religious groups, 
in an effort both to stem regional rivalries and to spread the benefits that flow from 
political leadership.38
Despite efforts to dampen regional and ethnic tensions, the mix of ethnicities and 
religions has exploded into violence from time to time, the most seriously during the 
Biafran civil war in the late 1960s.   To this day, conflict remains a significant problem, 
36
 CIA Factbook, supra note 32. 
37 See, Paden, supra note 29 at  fn. 1.
38
 At the time of independence in 1960, Nigeria was divided into three regions:  the North, dominated by 
Hausa & Fulani ethnic groups, the West, dominated by Yorubas, and the East, dominated by Igbos.  See, 
TOYIN FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 10-11 (1999).  Over the past 44 years, Nigeria has been led by a 
northerner, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was killed in a coup led by southeastern Igbos, who in turn 
were overthrown in a counter-coup led by Yakubu Gowon, a northerner from Middle Belt, which 
precipitated the three-year long Biafran civil war.  The Gowon government broke the three regions of 
Nigeria into 12 to dampen regional tensions.  This government lasted until 1975 when it was overthrown by 
Murtala Muhammed another northerner who, along with Olesgun Obasanjo a Yoruba Christian, ruled until 
Muhammed was assassinated and Obsanjo took over.  Obsanjo, a military officer, voluntarily turned power 
over to a northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979.  In 1983, a military coup displaced Shagari with 
Muhammad Buhari, which was overthrown in 1985 by General Ibrahim Babaginda and Suni Abacha.  
Babaginda ruled until 1993, when elections were held.  Chief M.K.O. Abiola a Yoruba from the south won 
these elections, which were annulled by Babaginda, who then transferred power to an short-lived interim 
government, which was replaced by rule by Abacha.   Abacha died in 1998.  Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian, 
was elected in 1999.  On the problems associated with power sharing and the marginalization of ethnic 
groups in Nigeria, see Tunde Babawale, The Rise of Ethnic Militias, Delegitimisation of the State, and the 
Threat to Nigerian Federalism, 3 WEST AFRICA REVIEW, available at http://westafricareview.com/war/
vol3.1/babawale.html.
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as certain groups within Nigeria fear domination by others and often perceive those in 
charge as corrupt.39 Discontent has led to repeated demands for a change in leadership –
or, often, to a violent coup to replace a leader perceived as illegitimate or biased with 
someone more considered more trustworthy. However, while increasing ethnic and 
religious polarization among Nigerians drives much of the nation’s violence, the
underlying issue that often grounds this violence is property and land-tenure disputes. 
This paper attempts to identify a possible connection between the current Nigerian 
property-rights regime and riots that have left thousands dead.   The focus is on Plateau 
state for a number of reasons.  First, Plateau is unique among the northern Nigerian states 
in that the hold of the Islamic Sokoto Caliphate was fairly tenuous in the region.40
Indigenous customary norms may have lasted longer in Plateau than in many other 
regions of northern Nigeria.  This means that those norms continued to develop and 
modify throughout the 19th century, rather than being replaced by “foreign” Maliki rules 
and customs.41 Even under British rule, significant deference was shown to customary 
norms and  traditions in Plateau state.  The British “hands off” policy of indirect rule 
meant that indigenous norms regarding land tenure and dispute resolution were largely 
protected and enforced by the colonial-era Native Court system.42  Finally, I focus on 
Plateau because there is clear recognition, in international media outlets, that some of the 
39 KARL MAIER, THIS HOUSE HAS FALLEN:  MIDNIGHT IN NIGERIA, 11-19 (2000). 
40
 British colonial official Lord Hailey writes:  “The Fulani system of rule did not, however, extend 
throughout Northern Nigeria; on the Bauchi plateau and south of the Benue River there were large areas 
where `pagan’ tribes had never fully acquiesced in it.  Though it would have been convenient to treat those 
areas as falling within the Fulani system, this was not thought to be justified.”  LORD HAILEY, AN AFRICAN 
SURVEY REVISED 1956, 454 (1957). 
41 ROBERT MCC. NETTING, HILL FARMERS OF NIGERIA, 46-47  (1968).
42 Id. at 48-51.
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violence in Plateau is tied to disputes over access to, and control of land.43  For these 
reasons, Plateau presents a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of centralized 
government action (nationalization legislation) -- coupled with problems of corruption 
and increasing heterogeneity -- on the spontaneous evolution of customary land tenure 
and property-rights norms.  
The Property Environment:  Property in Land and Land Tenure in Nigeria
Before 1978, there were three primary sources of property law in Nigeria:  customary 
law, English common and statutory law, and post-colonial legislation.  As of 1978, land 
law in Nigeria is based exclusively on a federal statute that has been incorporated into the 
Nigerian Constitution:  The Land Use Act of 1978.44
Customary Land Law
Traditionally, the belief was that property in land in Nigeria belonged to God, but was 
held communally, in a community-based tenure system.45  Under this system, the first 
43
 See discussion supra, pages 2-4.  
44
 Land Use Act, supra note 14. 
45See N.O. Adedipe, J.E. Olawoye, E.S. Olarinde & A.Y. Okediran, Rural communal tenure regimes and 
private landownership in western Nigeria, LAND REFORM BULLETIN:  1997/2, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) available at 
http://www.fao.org/sd/LTdirect/LR972/w6738t13.htm, and  Nigeria: Land Use, Soils, and Land  Tenure, 
Sec. 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES ,available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?cstdy:1:./temp/~frd_5Hy0::.   Note, however, that in an older treatise on African customary 
law, ICJ Justice T.O. Elias argues that it is incorrect to conceive of the African land tenure system as 
communal.  Rather, it is more appropriate, he argues, to consider it as corporate.  See, T.O. Elias, THE 
NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW, 164. (1956). 
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person to clear and use unclaimed land would establish possession and use rights.46   This 
first possessor would allocate land to heads of families, based on need.47  Over time, the 
first possessor’s role would be taken on by a headman or traditional chief, who would 
allocate property to family heads.  These family heads would allocate land for use by
their family members.48
Among the duties of the chief were:  to manage community land reserves, to maintain 
group customs concerning land use, to ensure that the rights of the group were not 
diminished, and to see that the rights of group members and, as appropriate, the rights of 
strangers, were respected.  The chief held residuary, reversionary rights to the property as 
a trustee, on behalf of the group, never as an absolute owner.49  These duties provided the 
chief with income (often in the form of in-kind payments of agricultural products and/or 
with cash payments for serving as an arbiter of disputes) along with significant social 
status, as well as political control over the group.50
46 See Adedipe, et al, supra note 44.
47
 These rights may be perpetual or for a period of time.  See Emea Arua and Eugene Okorji,  
Multidimensional analysis of land tenure systems in eastern Nigeria, LAND REFORM BULLETIN: 1997/2 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) available at 
http://www.fao.org/sd/LTdirect/LR972/w6728t14.htm.  Also, rights for the temporary use of land could be 
granted to other groups.  An example would be granting the right to herders to allow their animals to graze 
the stubble in a field that has been harvested.  See  Ouedraogo & Toulmin, Tenure Rights and Sustainable 
Development in Western Africa:  A Regional Overview, Feb. 1999, at 2, available at:  
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/liveihoods/landrights/africa_west.htm. 
48
 Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 46 at 4. 
49 Elias, supra note 44 at 164.
50
 On the issue of payments of chiefs for land-related duties see GAZETTEERS OF THE NORTHERN 
PROVINCES OF NIGERIA, Vol. IV 174  (1972). 
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The chief, usually along with appropriate elders, had primary responsibility for managing 
the indigenous dispute resolution process concerning land-use rights.51  In some groups, 
permanent tribunals existed, with identifiable judicial officers, whose job it was to bring 
offenders before the tribunal and thereby help preserve social order.52   Land disputes 
were an important part of the case work of such tribunals.   Cases involving land might 
address boundary disputes, disputes over the length of time one party was permitted to 
borrow or lease land, or rights of a party to occupy land in perpetuity if it seemed the land 
had been gifted away.53
When a dispute among members of the same family lineage arose, the aggrieved party 
would call for a meeting of the family or village headman and his advisors to resolve the 
issue.54  The headman and/or elders would request that the aggrieved party state his or her
case.  The accused party would also be asked to state what he or she knew about the 
dispute.   This oral evidence relied, obviously, on the memories of disputants, family 
members, and witnesses to transactions.   The headman, along with elders, would cross-
examine witnesses and then consult among themselves in order to reach at a decision.55
These norms created a kind of informal property registry, or recording office.   Reliance 
on memories requires disputants and adjudicators to draw heavily from the bank of 
51
 For an interesting discussion of dispute resolution among the Tiv, an ethnic group located near, but not 
in, Plateau state see PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV, 30-31 (1989).  While 
chiefs and elders often met in a kind of judicial session, disputes might also be taken directly to a chief for 
resolution.   See also Elias, supra note 44 at 238-243 for a description of the way in which a civil case was 
conducted.
52
 Elias, supra note 44 at 218-19.
53 See Bohannan, supra note 50 at 60 and GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 114.
54 See Elias, supra note 44 at 217-222.  Elias notes that disputes over land were considered “great” subject 
matter and so would often be resolved in the chief’s court, under more formal rules of procedure.  
55
 Bohannan, supra note 50 at 28-69.
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dispersed local knowledge.56   This process, which requires people to proclaim openly, or 
“publish,” what they know and to swear to the truthfulness of their statements, is one 
possible way to reduce information asymmetries – thereby reducing the costs of 
transacting.57 Relatively transparent communications of this sort may also decrease 
levels of uncertainty within a community.  On the other hand, there are clear drawbacks 
to reliance on memory.  However, in an isolated area with a small and compact 
population, such an approach may have been cost effective, compared with more formal, 
and costly, specification of rights.58
In cases of disputes between families or villages, the headman or sub-chief would 
approach a headman or sub-chief of a third group. This third party would attempt to 
resolve the dispute if both parties to the dispute agreed.59 If they refused to submit to the 
third-party adjudication, this would be reported to the tribe’s main chief.60 If the case 
warranted it, this head chief would be called on to hear and resolve the dispute. In cases 
of disputes between tribes, emissaries would be sent by the aggrieved tribe to the tribe
allegedly causing the harm, asking for redress.  In some cases, appeal was made directly 
to a third tribe to act as mediator.61
56 See generally  F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society 35 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  No. 4, 
519-530 (1945). 
57Note that such publication becomes costly in high-risk environments where officials, or others, can seize 
resources with relative impunity.  See Benito Arruñada,  Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION, at 410 and 412-13 (2003).  See also, Feder and Feeny, 
supra note 21 at 140.
58 YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2-4 (1989).
59
 Elias, supra note 44 at 217.
60 Id.  at 217.
61 Id.  at 218.   
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Even in less hierarchical societies, those in which political power was dispersed, civil 
disputes were handled in a similar manner: namely, by resort to an elder who would hear 
a dispute, then appeal to a more influential elder, or, if a case was especially important, it 
would be taken to an ad hoc council of elders of the family lines in the local 
community.62  A variety of other methods for initiating the resolution phase existed.63
Paul Bohannan notes that land disputes were quite common, though he doesn’t comment 
on the frequency with which they led to violence.64
Family members had possession rights and rights to use land located in the family’s 
territory.  In other words, land was jointly owned on a kinship basis.65 Under the 
customary tenure system, women normally could neither own nor inherit property, 
though their husbands typically “gave” them some land to work each year.66
Traditionally, women had usufructory rights over certain land as long as they lived with 
their husband’s family.67
62 Id.  at 220.
63
 These included announcing a dispute by beating drum throughout a village, which works to call elders
together, the party seeking redress might go to a group of spiritual elders, whose jurisdiction might be 
broader than that of village elders, a spear might be place before an accused party’s home, signifying the 
need for speedy resolution of the claim.  In cases where the offender was unknown, a “diviner” would be 
used to help identify the culprit – though this variety of detective work was rarely used in private, civil 
suits.  Id. at 220-21. 
64
 Bohannan, supra note 50 at 31.  However, there is some evidence that land disputes in Plateau during the 
colonial era were somewhat uncommon.  The GAZETTEER, discussing the Jos region, states:  “Disputes 
about the ownership of land are rare and, when they do occur, they invariably arise out of a lease or loan.” 
GAZETTEER, supra note 49 at 114.   Additionally, news reports claim that Muslims and Christians in these 
areas “had coexisted peacefully in these rural communities for decades, but that all changed in 2001 when a 
complex mixture of religious issues, disputes over land tenure and politics led to a spat of tit-for-tat killings 
and communal attacks.”  See Nigeria, 2,500 displaced in Plateau State violence, supra note 17.
65
 Adedipe, et. al., supra note 44.  
66
 Netting, supra note 40 at 167.
67
 Arua & Okorji, supra note 46 at 4 . 
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An individual was required to use land to benefit the family or community group.68  So 
long as an individual was making beneficial use of land he could keep the property, pass 
it on to his heirs, and even pledge its use in satisfaction of a debt.69  Individuals, as well 
as families, had rights to exclude both strangers and, in certain situations, family 
members.  However, non-family members (strangers) could, if given permission by the 
headman or chief, use land in the territory of the community of which he became a 
member – a point to which I will return to.70 Further, groups and individuals could lend 
land.  Indeed, so long as land was available, the group or individual holding the unused 
land could not refuse to lend to one who asked, though increasing scarcity has placed
strains on the lending system.71
Generally, individuals were not able to sell or mortgage property.72 However, a near 
equivalent of sale could be created by pledging land and never redeeming it.73
Furthermore, there is evidence that in areas where significant labor was expended 
developing land for farming, a system approaching individualized tenure existed.74
68
 Cooter discusses one of the key roles played by a communal property system:  “Customary land law 
creates an incentive structure for cooperation and coordination among kin in the production and distribution 
of goods.  The incentive structure includes a network of mutual obligations, which restricts everyone’s 
freedom.  In such a network there can be no unitary, absolute ownership.”  Cooter, supra note 16 at p. 15.  
69 See Library of Congress Studies, supra note 44   Individuals could leave land unused for periods of time 
and still exert claims over land.  The period of non-use could not be “unreasonable” however, or the 
individual would forfeit his rights.  See also, Elias, supra note 44 at 163.
70 RICHARD OLANIYAN (ed.) NIGERIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE,  98 (1984) .  See also A.S. Bamire and Y.L. 
Fabiyi, Economic implications of property rights on smallholder use of fertilizer in southwest Nigeria, 
LAND REFORM available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y2519T/y2519t08.htm.
71
 Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 46 at 4.
72 Olaniyan, supra note 69 at 98.
73
 Netting, supra note 40 at 166.
74
 Netting states:  “The multiplicity of arrangements for sharing, renting, and loaning land insures that an 
existing land base can be periodically redistributed according to need while preserving the principle 
fundamental to Kofyar intensive agriculture, that land is an individual possession.” Id. at 167-68.
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Individuals were unable to acquire property by adverse possession.75 However, 
individuals had full rights of ownership in physical structures they added to real property,
as well as to plants/trees they added.76  The customary idea of rights to land did not, 
apparently, include the rights to items found on the land that someone else placed there.
This fact means that one family could have use rights to the soil, and another family, who 
had planted nut trees on the land, could have rights protect, maintain, and use the nuts.  
Under customary norms, the legal idea of land was limited to the soil.  Finally, it was 
only the family or the community, acting under the direction of family and/or community 
leaders, who could dispose of property.
Towns and villages could also hold land.  These lands typically included grazing and 
hunting lands, market sites, and such areas as sacred groves.77 Today, corporate bodies, 
known as corporate aggregates, still hold land under communal tenure.78  Some lands 
were “attached” to particular offices, or positions:  obas in the south and emirs in the 
north.  Legal interests in these lands were absolute rights.  Over time, the role of the obas
and emirs with regards to land has diminished and these traditional leaders have lost 
some of their prestige and power.79
75
 Elias, supra note 44 at 163. 
76 Id. at 166.
77 Adedipe, et. al. supra note 44.
78
 Arua & Okorji,  supra note 46.  Corporate aggregates include rural towns, villages, patrilineal and 
matrilineal groups, as well as extended and nuclear families. 
79 Id. 
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Much land in Nigeria is still held based on customary rights.  However, both population 
and the demand for land have increased. 80   As a result, land available for use and 
development is becoming scarcer. Studies from the mid-20th century report limited 
availability of land in some areas and the sale of land in certain districts. 81  After 
Nigerian independence in 1960 land sales continued, furthering a move away from 
communal ownership and towards increased private ownership.82 In order to sell land 
under the customary law, the family member wishing to sell must receive the consent of 
all principal members of the family.  For the transaction to be valid consideration must 
be paid, and the seller must provide evidence of the “handing over” of possession in the 
presence of witnesses.83  Once families, or communities, begin to partition family or 
communal land this is a signal that customary tenure rights are ending. However, in some 
areas, purchase of land remains difficult.84
The ability of families and communities to hold land based on customary rights was 
modified by the 1978 Land Use Decree, which vests ownership of all land in the 
government “to be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all 
Nigerians.”85 The Act apparently attempts to create a British-style land-tenure system in 
80The 1991 national census put the population of Plateau State at 2,959,599. See People, Population and 
Settlement, ONLINENIGERIA available at http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/plateauadv.asp?blurb=462 .  
This compares with an estimated population in 1998 of 4,627,043.  See footnote 12 infra. 
81Netting, supra note 40 at p. 100.  GAZETTEERS reports sales of land among the Angas tribe of Plateau.  
See GAZETTEERS supra note 49 at p. 166.
82
 Chimah Ezeomah , Land Tenure Constraints Associated with Some Recent Experiments to Bring Formal 
Education to Nomadic Fulani in Nigeria, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (ODI), Pastoral 
Development Network, Agricultural Administration Unit available at www.odi.org/uk/pdn/papers/20d.pdf.   
See also Bamire and Fabiyi, supra note 69 at 3 who note that increased reliance on cash crops such as 
cocoa, oil palm, cola nut and coffee, in conjunction with technologies that increase agricultural production, 
making agricultural land more valuable are also leading to increased individual ownership. 
83
 Adedipe, et. al., supra note 44.
84
 Arua & Okorji, supra note 46.
85
 Land Use Decree, supra note 14, § 1.   
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which the crown/sovereign holds ultimate title to land, but allows for long-term leasing of 
property.86 Land-administration functions were taken from chiefs, family heads, local 
communities and transferred to administrative agencies.  Issues involving the sale, lease 
or inheritance of land were, according to the law, to be managed by these agencies, which 
operate under the office of the state governors.87
Previous forms of title were replaced by “certificates of occupancy,” which are issued by 
either state officials (in the case of urban land) or local government officials (in the case 
of most rural land).88  These officials have the power to revoke customary rights if land is 
needed for a public purpose.  
In addition to this change in the legal environment, exogenous factors are causing 
changes in the customary tenure system.  As noted above, increases in population are a 
problem, as are migrations resulting from the increased desertification of northern 
Nigeria, and increasing urbanization, all of which increases pressure on land use in 
northern and middle belt Nigeria.89  These pressures may lead to a desire among 
inhabitants for increased individualization of tenure and away from the restrictive Land 
Use Act regime and the traditional communal property tenure system.90
86 Cite to British land law --
87
 Donald C. Williams, Measuring the Impact of Land Reform Policy in Nigeria, 30 JOURNAL OF MODERN 
AFRICAN STUDIES, 589 (Dec., 1992).
88
 Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 46 at 16.
89
 Sengupta, supra note 7.
90
 Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 46 at 5.  Lord Hailey recognized similar pressures in Nigeria in the 
mid 20th century when he noted that “The principal effect of economic development (in Nigeria) has been 
seen in the increasing tendency to delimit individual holdings, both in Muslinm and pagan areas.”  Hailey, 
supra note 39 at 789.
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Property Norms in Northern Nigeria
Until the early 19th century, northern Nigeria was largely controlled by the Hausas – the 
main ethnic group in northern Nigeria.  The Hausas maintained a customary land-tenure 
system until the first decade of the 19th century.  During the very early 19th century, 
Muslim Fulanis, led by Usman dan Fodio, extended their control over a significant 
portion of northern Nigeria, creating the Sokoto Caliphate.91 As they did, they instituted 
changes in land-tenure rules.  The new Fulani rulers took control of Hausa lands and 
vested ownership rights over these lands in the Sultan of Sokoto.92 Land held by the 
Sultan was divided into reserve lands, which was “state” property to be used by the 
Sultanate; cultivated lands, for which imams determined the use allocations; unused 
lands, also under the control of imams, and finally, waqf lands, to be used for the benefit 
of the entire community.93  This system provided extensive control over land to imams, 
who would grant use rights and who would also, at times, assign unused land without 
reference to needs of the local community.94
However, while Plateau state is part of northern Nigeria, it was subject to only limited 
Fulani control – primarily on the periphery of the region.95 Most of the inhabitants of the 
interior of Plateau were free from the Fulani conquest,96 and so, Fulani institutions did 
not take root there. The Fulani were unable to exercise extensive control over Plateau
91
 Falola, supra note 37 at 35.
92
 Ezeomah, supra note 81 at 2.  
93
 John Paden, Islamic Political Culture and Constitutional Change in Nigeria, 11 ISSUE:  A JOURNAL OF 
OPINION, 25 (Spring-Summer, 1981). 
94
 Library of Congress Study, supra note 44.
95 GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 30-36.
96
 Netting, supra note 40 at 46.
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because its rugged terrain, coupled with the fiercely independent nature of its inhabitants, 
made both military conquest and subsequent administration too costly.97  The Plateau 
region provided a refuge for people escaping a variety of potential overlords.98
Even in the 19th century, Plateau was highly heterogeneous, and was composed of many 
small ethnic groups who lived independently from one another, but who engaged in some 
trade.99 The various tribes that inhabited Plateau moved there in order to escape threats 
posed by slave-raiding expeditions from the coastal regions and from the Islamic north.  
Another motive was their search for available land.100 In the 19th century, the people of 
Plateau were primarily animists and had a less developed, less hierarchical political and 
social structure than did the Hausa/Fulanis.101
After the British took control of Nigeria in 1900, they created different governing 
structures in the North and South:  the Protectorate of North Nigeria and the Protectorate 
of South Nigeria. 102 As is true to this day, southern Nigeria was richer than the north and 
had a stronger tradition of autonomy.  However, as the North had a well developed 
administrative structure and was governed by what the British viewed as a “respectful” 
97 GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 31.
98 Olaniyan, supra note 69 at 84-5. This means that there was no one supreme oba or emir in Plateau.  
Rather, there were many leaders of small, discrete groups. 
99 Id. at 83-4.
100
 Netting, supra note 40 points out:  “The need to avoid slaving depredations seems to be reflected in a 
zone of dense population in the hills and immediately adjoining lowlands, with large areas of fertile plain to 
the south left empty.” (p. 46)  This observation is of significant import, as it may help us understand why 
control over fertile land in Plateau state – particularly in the Yelwa region – is contested.  There may be 
only limited history of “control” by particular groups, thus allowing others to make competing claims.
101 Id.at 44; see also, Olaniyan, supra note 69 at 84-87.
102 Falola, supra note 37 at 68-69.  
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and conservative leadership, they adopted a “hands-off” approach to the north.103 The 
British institution of indirect rule largely left the Muslim leadership in place. 104  It also 
respected the sharia law of the north as well as the customary laws of the area.105
The British arrived in Plateau region in 1904, in response to requests by the Niger 
Company, which faced hostile inhabitants and repeatedly closed trading routes.106  For 
reasons similar to those faced by the Fulani, the British were unable to subdue the 
inhabitants of the area in the early years of their rule.107  It took repeated use of armed 
force to quell uprisings and inter-ethnic violence. When the inhabitants were, finally, 
brought under control, the British created a somewhat different governance structure for 
Plateau; not based on rule by emirs, but based on a high degree of self-rule at the local 
level.108 Discussing the British approach to rule in Nigeria, Lord Hailey says:   
The distinctive concepts which have determined the use of that system [Native 
Authority] are shortly as follows.  It has in the first place avoided as far as 
possible the employment of any local authority which has not held a recognized 
position of influence derived from indigenous custom or tradition.  Second, it has 
contemplated that the entities so employed (whether they have been Chiefs, 
Chiefs in Council, Councils of Headmen, or groups of Elders) should rely mainly 
on the authority they derive from indigenous custom when giving their aid in the 
103 Id. at 70.
104 Id. Falola says, “[I]ndirect rule as deployed to consolidate power and to overcome the various obstacles 
posed by communications and by limitations of personnel and finance.  The ideological assumption was 
that the British and Nigerians were culturally different and the best way to govern them was through the 
institutions which they themselves had invented.”   He goes on to note that indirect rule allowed the British 
to govern at low cost by co-opting local rulers who continued to administer indigenous institutions.
105
 Ezeomah, supra note 81 at 2.  The version of sharia applied in Nigeria is the Maliki form which follows 
precedent, opinions and reasoning developed under the Sunni Muslim tradition.  Imams and emirs are the 
key legal decision makers, interpreting the law to the case at hand.  Under the Sokoto Caliphate the emir
was the chief imam and served as the court of last appeal (the grand kadi).  In contemporary Nigeria, sharia
courts have been created for each state with a grand kadi appointed for each.  See, Paden, supra note 92 at 
25.
106
 Plateau Province was formally created by the British in 1926.  See, GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 117-
18.
107 Id. at 39-41.
108 Id. at 46- 48.
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furtherance of schemes of social or economic welfare promoted by the 
Administration.109
The Native Authority system gave chiefs and elders primarily responsibility for the 
functioning of local government; they were particularly important in the creation and 
functioning of Native Courts. 110  As decision makers in this new dispute resolution 
process, local leaders would have continued to bring their deep local knowledge to bear 
on conflict resolution.  Indeed if, as one critic argues, the British purposefully kept 
formally trained lawyers out of the Native Courts, then it seems likely that the indigenous 
dispute resolution norms developed under customary law prevailed in Native Courts.111
In Plateau, the British attempted to create a tribunal for each tribe and even for sub-tribal 
units. Some large tribes had more than one court.  The members of the courts acted as an 
advisory council for the Executive Chief, who served as President of the court.  The 
British also created seven “Alkalai” Courts, for use by non-indigenous, Muslim 
inhabitants of Plateau.112 When Plateau was divided into Districts in 1927, each district 
was assigned District Heads – both “Pagan” (animist) and Fulani (muslim).  Starting in 
1930, the “Pagan” Heads began supervising tax collection, including collection of the 
cattle tax imposed on the Fulani herdsmen.113  The notion was to move toward more 
109
 Hailey, supra note 39 at 452. 
110
 Falola, supra note 37 at 71, and GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 49-50.
111There has been criticism of the British approach to staffing Native Courts.  Critics argue that the British 
chose to appoint tribal leaders rather than trained legal academics or practitioners to these positions.  The 
result was a system in which individuals with little or no formal legal training, and beholden to colonial 
authorities for their lucrative positions, were in power.  Such criticism, while valid, appears to discount the 
informal training and deep familiarity with social norms and customs that such leaders would have 
possessed.  For a discussion of the drawbacks of the British model of staffing Native Courts see Falola, 
supra note 37 at 71.
112 GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 49.
113 Id. at 119.
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extensive indirect rule and allow the local inhabitants greater control of the structures of 
governance.  A further example of this approach is Lord Hailey’s observation that:  “The 
scope of rule-making power of Native Authorities was extended in 1945 to embrace the 
definition and modification of Native law and custom.  In the same year they were also 
given special power to deal with matters relating to the tenure of land.  .  .” 114
Because of the diversity of tribes in Plateau, and differences related to population density, 
soil fertility, and abundance or scarcity of land, there were differences among land-tenure 
norms. 115  For example, the Gazetteer reports that in the Pankshin Division (eastern 
Plateau) among the Angas tribe, a man who cultivated land held tenure similar to 
freehold.116  The report notes that farm land was sold, but for a low price (indicating 
relative abundance of land at the time).  However, land in this area was not leased or 
pawned.  The practices in Pankshin may be contrasted with those of the Jos Division 
(northern Plateau) where land was held in a manner more like a lease in perpetuity.117
Land could be leased to or borrowed by others.  Leases tended to be long-term with no 
set termination date, but with an annual payment in kind.   Sale of land was rare in this 
area – except around the town of Ganawuri, where there was valuable fertile land.118  In 
the Shendam Division, it seems that inhabitants held many sticks in the bundle of 
property rights, but not enough to warrant their tenure being labeled “freehold.”  This 
114
 Hailey, supra note 39 at 455.
115
 Though the GAZETTEERS states:  “This mention of farming disputes brings us to the question of land 
tenure about which tribal customs do not differ very much.  Generally speaking all the land originally 
belonged to the chief of the tribe or village, by right of priority of settlement and ability to defend his 
boundaries and no land was taken up for building or farming except with the consent of the chief.”
GAZETTEERS, supra note 49 at 113. 
116Id. at 166.
117 Id. at 113.
118 Id. at 114-5.  The availability of “valuable” fertile land is indicative of a certain scarcity and may help 
explain the evidence of sale in the region.  
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land could not be sold and chiefs could dispossess inhabitants for disloyalty or as 
punishment for a serious crime such a murder.119 The Gazetteer notes:  “Disputes about 
the ownership of land are very rare, and when they do occur, they invariably arise out of 
a lease or loan.”120
In 1916, the British enacted the Lands and Native Rights Ordinance,121 which created a 
peculiar bifurcated approach to land law in Nigeria.  In southern Nigeria, most lands 
belonged to private citizens – not the government.  Some property was held by a “stool” 
(a seat of political authority within a communal land-holding ethnic group), other 
property by communal or family groups and some by individual ownership.122 Land 
ownership and the sale of land were tracked in the south via a registry system.123
A very different system applied to northern Nigeria.124 In the north, the British declared 
all land in the former Fulani fiefs to be public property.  The fief system was abolished 
and ownership over land in northern Nigeria was transferred to the British crown.  As 
owners of the land, the British government required those on the land to apply for 
occupancy permits, though the government routinely recognized customary rights of 
occupancy.125  This system placed limits on outsiders’ abilities to move into northern 
119 Id. at 214. 
120 Id. at 114.  Note that the level of dispute could be low for several reasons.  For example, if land is 
abundant it may be less costly to move rather than engage in dispute over ownership.  If customary norms 
and claims are recognized as legitimate, there might be relatively few disputes over ownership.  Finally, 
disputes are suppressed, for some reasons, they would be less visible.
121Cap. 105, Laws of Nigeria, 1948.
122
 Segun Famoriyo, Land Tenure and Food Production in Nigeria, 41 LAND TENURE NEWSLETTER, 14 
Land Tenure Center ( July-September, 1973). 
123
 Library of Congress Studies, supra note 44.
124 See LAND AND NATIVE RIGHTS ORDINANCE, supra note 120. 
125
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areas.126    It also had the effect of creating segregated areas of “strangers,” or, Sabon 
Garis. Settlers were those people whose relatives had been in the area longer than “non-
indigenes” or “strangers.”   Non-indigenes were granted were lesser legal rights than 
settlers.  This differential access to land, to local government services, and to political 
representation created tensions throughout the northern Nigeria – tensions that remain to 
this day.
As a part of northern Nigeria, these same rules applied in Plateau state.  Yet, because the 
British administrators showed significant deference to local customs there, and because 
authorities had greater difficulty “reaching” into the hinterlands of Plateau and exerting 
control, the actual, de facto impact of the Land and Native Ordinance Act in much of 
Plateau might have been muted.127  Instead, it seems that customary norms surrounding 
tenure rights, leasing, borrowing, pledging, and even sales of land, continued to develop 
alongside more extensive British control in cities such as Jos or in other northern 
states.128   The British expanded the legal authority of the Native Authorities to control 
the use and disposition of land in 1945.129    This ordinance “[C]onfers on Native 
Authorities more extensive powers than they have in any other British dependency.  They 
may make rules for the control of alienation and mortgaging, for prescribing that 
purchase at sale shall be subject to their approval, for regulating the allocation of 
‘communal or family land’ and for controlling its use.”130  Thus, just as during the pre-
126
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Thus, non-natives, people moving from one part of Nigeria to another, or immigrants, could not acquire 
rights to land under this statute.  See Adedipe, et al., supra note 44 at 4. 
127
 Hailey, supra note 39 at 452-54. 
128 Id. at 789. 
129 Id. at 790. 
130 Id. 
30
colonial era, under British rule local Nigerian authorities exercised extensive legal control 
of land resources.
Finally, following independence in 1960 the regional government of Northern Nigeria 
enacted the Land Tenure Law.  The Land Tenure Law declares: 
“(a) . . . the whole of the lands of Northern Nigeria, whether occupied or 
unoccupied, are hereby declared to be natives lands.  (b) All native lands and all 
rights over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject to the 
disposition of the Minister and shall be held and administered for the use and 
common benefit of the natives, and no title to occupation and use of any such 
lands by a non-native shall be valid without the consent of the Minister.”131
It extended the system created by the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1916.  
Further, it created formal restrictions for landholding rights by non-northerners.132 Under 
the 1962 Land Tenure Law, rights of occupancy could be for an indefinite term, however 
such right were often specified, on the “Form of Application” for 99 years on residential 
plots, 40 years for non-northern Nigerians on residential plots, and a sliding scale of up to 
99 years for industrial plots.133 In northern Nigeria, land was held by occupancy permits
through the 1960s and 70s.  In the 1970s, farmers located on the outskirts of cities often 
had their permits revoked, and land was taken and redistributed for urban development.  
It appears that only minimal compensation was paid for these takings, leading to 
additional conflict over land.134   These conflicts, and concerns over the alleged 
speculation in land, set the stage for the next major development in the property rights 
regime in Plateau state:  the Land Use Act of 1978. 
131
 Cap. 59, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 at §§ 4 - 6. 
132
 Library of Congress Studies, supra note 44. See also, C.M. McDowell, The Interpretation of the Land 
Tenure Law of Northern Nigeria, 14 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW, No. 3 156  (1970). 
133
 See C.M. McDowell, supra note 131 at 163. 
134
 Library of Congress Studies, supra note 44.
31
The Land Use Act of 1978
The Land Use Act (LUA) was issued by the military government of Olusegun Obasanjo 
on March 29, 1978.135  The law nationalized all land in Nigeria .  At the time it went into 
effect, this law extinguished all existing rights to use and occupy land – including rights 
held by custom.136  Citizens were required to apply to the government for certificates of 
occupancy, which are either statutory or customary, in order to make claims on land or, 
more significantly, to transfer rights in land.  The law transferred primary responsibility 
for the management of communal land from the hands of chiefs or emirs to government 
officials.137
President Obasanjo stated that one reason for the statute was the “limiting, inhibiting and 
divisive nature of land tenure in the country.”138  The statute was designed to curb land 
speculation and real estate price increases, to open access to land for both private and 
public use, and to promote tenure security.139  The Land Use Act was offered as an 
attempt to rationalize a complex set of customary, common law, and statutory provisions 
dealing with land in Nigeria, thereby creating a uniform legal environment.  
135 Cap. 212, Revised Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
136See Bola Fajemirokun, Land and Resource Rights:  Issues of Public Participation and Access to Land in 
Nigeria, available at www.acts.or.ke/pap/rr/docs/SRCPAPLRR-bolspr.pdf. 
137
 Adedipe, et. al., supra note 44 at 4.
138 Fajemirokun, supra note 135 at 1. 
139 Id. at 1.
32
As noted earlier, the LUA vests control over land in State Governors, who have a 
fiduciary responsibility to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the citizens of 
Nigeria.  In a case from 1989, Makanjuola v. Balogun, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held 
that the effect of the LUA is to vest absolute ownership of land in each state in the hands 
of the State Governor.140   Under the statute, State Governors may issue certificates of 
occupancy for land in both urban and non-urban areas.141  Local government officials 
may only issue certificates for customary rights of occupancy in rural areas.  State 
Governors decide which areas are urban, and which are non-urban, and thus maintain 
significant power over land-allocation decisions.
State Governors are aided by Land Use and Allocation Committees that advise them on 
land-management issues in urban areas; on issues related to resettlement or to the 
revocation of rights based on public need.  Land Use and Allocation Committees are the 
“courts of first instance” in resolving disputes related to the awarding of certificates and 
to the payment of compensation when land is improved or taken for public use.142
Appeals from committees are taken to officials at the Ministry of Justice and then to the 
140
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formal court system.143 Land Allocation and Advisory Committees work with the Local 
Governments on similar issues.144
A statutory certificate of occupancy is typically issued for 99 years.145  The certificate 
acts as a kind of lease agreement between the government (the lessee) and the certificate 
holder (the lessor).  Before the right is granted the state determines the amount of “rent” 
to be paid by the certificate holder.146  Local governments may grant customary rights of 
occupancy only if there are no competing statutory rights.  Statutory rights trump 
customary rights.147
When a statutory certificate of occupancy is issued the certificate holder receives a set of 
rights, including rights to occupy, to use, and to improve property.  This bundle is clearly 
thinner than that of a fee simple owner under Anglo-American law. For example, the 
certificate holder cannot sell, gift, or sublet land without the consent of the State 
Governor.148 However, bequests of rights held under statutory and customary certificates 
of occupancy are managed by customary-law principles, not by statutory principles.149
Under the customary land-tenure system the chief, oba, headman, or emir all held 
significant power.150  In some cases chiefs and emirs abused their powers, allocating land 
to favorites, keeping strangers at bay, and requiring payoffs to permit land transactions to 
143 Id. at 604.
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occur.151 During the colonial period, the power that some chiefs and emirs held over 
land allocation ebbed as population growth increased the use of private sales of land.152
The Land Use Decree furthered this process, removing from traditional leaders their 
power to distribute a valuable resource – land – and of the income they garnered from 
land transactions.153 Donald C. Williams argues:  “The Land Use Decree .  .  .  was 
designed to pose a direct challenge to alternative sources of societal authority by 
relegating all private transactions in land to government agencies.”154
The Land Use Act shifts the power to allocate land away from traditional leaders and to 
government officials.  At the same time, those individuals who held substantial local 
knowledge of the land, its traditional allocations and uses, are no longer called on to 
make allocation decisions.   Individuals who may have little personal knowledge of the 
specifics of land holding and land use are instead called upon to decide who has rights to 
what.  Cutting the link between the local knowledge and allocation/use decisions is 
especially problematic in areas where customary law is widespread because customary 
law depends upon the memory of local leaders.  Written records were limited.  Local 
leaders would reach decisions based on their intimate knowledge of individuals and their 
151 Id.
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needs.155  Government officials are unlikely to have either this intimate knowledge or a 
reasonable substitute, given the paucity of written records.
By placing power to allocate land rights in the hands of politicians – state governors –
and, in turn, Land Use Allocation Committees and Land Allocation and Advisory 
Committees, the LUA has created a system in which government officials enjoy huge 
bargaining power advantages in issuing certificates or allowing a transfer or sale to take 
place.156 Quoting an article entitled “Establishing a Business in Nigeria” Williams 
observes:
With the arbitrary powers given to the Governor of the state as regards the 
issuance of a C of O (certificate of occupancy), and coupled with the ensuring 
bureaucratic red-tapism, it is almost easier to pass a camel through a needle’s eye 
than to get this certificate.  In the case of transfer of land, where the Governor’s 
consent is required before such transfer (be it temporary or permanent) can be 
effected, the consent is usually withheld until some exorbitant and ridiculous 
transfer fee (consent fee) is paid.157
These same government officials can reward favorites with certificates of occupancy.158
Cronies, family members, and politically well-connected individuals have much less 
difficulty obtaining certificates than do poorer, unconnected, and less well-educated 
citizens of Nigeria.159  In a study of the effects of the Land Use Decree, Peter Koehn 
155
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maintains:  “State government officials have effectively barred the rural and urban 
laboring classes from all types of statutory rights of occupancy.”160
The Land Use Act suffers from other shortcomings.  Due to the high level of corruption 
in the public sector, individuals have low levels of trust in the Nigerian bureaucracy.161
Because of their suspicion of public officials, many people may avoid seeking 
certificates, because they are required to show proof of payment of property taxes for 
three preceding years before a certificate will be issued.162  This requirement apparently 
leads officials to demand bribes before they declare tax records “clear.”163   Such 
corruption obviously increases the costliness of the process. 
Further the Land Use Act limits the size of land one may own depending on whether it is 
urban or rural and whether one is a farmer or herder.164  Such a one-size-fits-all (or, 
almost all) approach to land use ignores the differing abilities of individuals to 
successfully manage land.  The approach is reminiscent of the American government’s 
studies of improprieties suggest that those with wealth and close connections to State Governments are 
overwhelmingly beneficiaries of these programmes.”  See also, Libecap, supra note 22 at 17 who notes:  
“All things equal, those interest groups with greater wealth, size, and homogeneity will have more 
resources to influence politicians regarding the assignment of property rights. . .”  Plateau state is composed 
of many small groups, but is increasingly populated by members of larger, politically powerful ethnic 
groups:  Hausa and Fulani in particular.
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approach to western land held by the federal government:   parcel out plots of 160 acres –
whether that was an efficient size or not, and force settlers to live within in the constraints 
of this arbitrary limit.165 In Nigeria, the effects of the Land Use Act have been 
characterized in this way:  “The Land Use Act has arguably exacerbated the stress on 
land caused by population increase, and increased the risk of long-term soil and 
environmental degradation.”166
The Land Use Act extinguishes rights in undeveloped urban land over .5 hectare and 
limits the ability of individuals to possess multiple plots of developed land.167  It has been 
noted that valuable property is more likely to be registered than less valuable land –
presumably because the perceived benefits of registration exceed the costs of operating 
with the system.168
The system for registering land is seen as being inefficient, both because it is subject to 
rent seeking and because it is not capable of handling registrations efficiently, due to 
personnel shortages, poor training, and lack of equipment.169 Registry offices often lack 
maps and other evidence of property boundaries.  For these reasons, they may have 
difficulty validating evidence that is provided by claimants.  Over time, the costs 
associated with registering property have risen significantly.170
165 See  Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights: Or, How the West was Really Won, in THE 
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The many problems associated with the Land Use Act suggest that de facto property 
rights are quite insecure -- unless, perhaps, one has useful political connections.  As a 
result of these limitations, individuals often skirt the de jure  land law:  
“The tedious legal and bureaucratic formalities required for allocation of land in 
accordance with the Act have resulted in threatening the very survival and 
efficacy of the Act.  It is thus open knowledge that means of circumventing the 
spirit and letter of the Act are being actively sought.”171
As things currently stand in Plateau, a combination of barriers are working jointly to 
block the development of a smoothly functioning, legal real-property market.  These 
myriad problems lead citizens to circumvent the strictures of the Act.  Further, the 
perceived injustices of the system, coupled with ineffective enforcement by the state, may 
lead to a more serious problem – that of citizens taking “justice” into their own hands, 
pursuing strategies of violence over strategies of cooperative trading, which was the past 
property-rights norm.172
Blocking the Evolution of Property Norms: An Analysis of the Problem
With this background in mind, we can consider some possible answers to the question of 
why violent conflict over property is plaguing Plateau state.   As we have seen, a number 
Fajemirokun, supra note 135 at 5 observes:  “It is also noteworthy that the transaction costs for obtaining 
certificates of occupancy have become important sources of government revenues.” 
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of conflicts in Plateau involve Christian farmers and Muslim herders competing for fertile 
land.  Rising population, increasing heterogeneity, and ineffective government 
enforcement combine to raise costs associated with negotiating property rights claims.173
It appears that existing methods for managing conflict have failed:  neither customary 
norms nor legislative mechanisms are sufficient to stop violent conflict.   A close 
examination of the customary legal environment and the Land Use Act reveals that a gap 
likely exists between the two.174 This gap may help explain why people in Plateau have 
turned to violence to solve property-rights disputes.   
Evidence indicates that Plateau was settled by many small ethnic groups, who lived in 
relative isolation due to the geography of the region and group preference.175 These 
groups developed a rich customary law with a wide-ranging set of property rights and 
contracting norms that allowed them to trade rights internally and also provided 
mechanisms for trading rights with strangers.  Evidence indicates that relatively peaceful 
trading of property rights predominated and that resort to violence to settle property-
rights claims was limited until fairly recently.176
173 Id. at 49-52.  
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The variety of rights in land, and of contracting vehicles, is striking though by no means 
uncommon in communal property regimes.177   This variety indicates a rich institutional 
response to the problem of internalizing externalities.178 As we have seen, the traditional 
communal-property regime has lasted, despite the imposition of legislation by both the 
British and post-colonial governments that was designed to change the property-rights 
environment.  The persistence of this system may be taken as evidence of the importance 
of protecting family-based relationships, of providing incentives to cooperate and 
coordinate production activities in a useful manner, and of effectively allocating 
resources.179  Indigenous dispute resolution -- which was accessible, relatively 
inexpensive, and largely transparent -- may also have helped to spread information, 
promote cooperation, and lessen conflict within and between ethnic groups.180
There is evidence from Plateau that rights to land existed on a continuum, from 
traditional communal property rights to tenure rights that looked very similar to freehold.  
Not surprisingly, more extensive rights existed in those areas where investment in land
was high – as was the case, for example, with the Kofyars, who invested heavily in 
building terraces and in fertilizing their relatively scarce land.181
The thickness of the property-rights bundle that individuals held under customary law 
meant that individuals had increased opportunities to trade these rights and, in turn, to 
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benefit from expanded trading opportunities – so long as the rights were enforced.  To the 
extent that individuals hold thicker, as opposed to thinner, bundles of property rights they 
will have increased opportunities to take advantage of dispersed local knowledge, pursue 
entrepreneurial opportunities, and gain from trade.  A thicker bundle may indicate 
additional room to experiment, to try different approaches to solving allocation and use 
problems.  In their isolated environment, the inhabitants of Plateau seem to have gained 
from broad trading of rights to lend, pledge, use, and borrow land.
The richness of the customary legal environment also indicates that the law was relatively
elastic, responding to changing needs over time through an evolutionary process.182
While communal property remained the norm in Plateau state, there was some 
movement, over time, towards more individualized tenure over land.183  In a situation 
where the demand for land increases, either through changes in population or technology, 
one would expect to see a community respond by expending more resources in defining 
property rights and in moving from communal ownership toward more individualized 
tenure, in the form of sale or, its near-equivalent, unredeemed pledges.184 Such a move 
is one way for previously homogeneous communities to deal with the costs of 
information asymmetries that arise as the network of contacts and potential trading 
partners increase.185  In Plateau, individuals recognized the gains to be had from greater 
182 See David E. Ault and Gilbert Rutman, The Development of Individual Rights to Property in Tribal 
Africa, 22 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, No. 1 171 (Apr. 1979). 
183 See discussion supra at 18-19. See also, Demsetz, supra note13 at 350 who notes:  “I do not mean to 
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185
 Feder & Feeny, supra note 21 at 140.  
42
specification of property rights.186  These unknown entrepreneurs “created” a new right –
the right to sell property.187  By accommodating this entrepreneurial activity, the 
indigenous legal system expanded options for allocating property rights. 
Even limited evidence of the existence of land sales indicates that the indigenous legal 
system was evolving in response to a changing environment.188  The use of the 
unredeemed pledge, for example, provides evidence of a shift toward increased 
individualization of tenure, and hence, an evolution of traditional communal-property 
norms.  A movement towards greater individualization of land-tenure rights will occur 
when the marginal benefits of creating and enforcing the rights exceed the marginal costs 
associated with the new rights.189
In Plateau, there is evidence that such a process was taking place in mid-20th century.  In 
the case of the Kofyar people, Netting notes that:  
“The Kofyar insist that every square inch of arable soil, both village and bush, has 
an owner, a single person to whom the land belongs and who alone may decide on 
its use.  This is probably a direct outgrowth of intensive farming.  Wherever land 
186
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can be made to produce heavily and continuously over a long period of time, it 
increases in value to both the occupant and his heirs.”190
With the Kofyar, both factors may have been at work, resulting in a distinctive 
institutional response to the issue of land allocation. 
Another interesting example of the flexibility of the customary legal environment in 
Plateau state – one that promoted homogeneity and its attendant benefits by aligning 
property-rights expectations -- was the provision for incorporating, or adopting, 
“strangers” into kinship groups.191   The mechanism of allocating property to strangers in 
perpetuity was, in essence, a method for inducing homogeneity and thereby managing 
problems associated with heterogeneity.192
The process typically began whenever a stranger allied him or herself to a member of the 
community and lived with that family, establishing a good reputation.193  T.O. Elias 
notes:  “The practice has almost always been that strangers would attach themselves to an 
influential person with whose family they would normally have been lodging for some 
period prior to a formal request being made on their behalf by their host.”194 During this 
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period the stranger absorbed the norms and expectations of the adoptive group.195  The 
adoptive family monitored this process and also did their best to ensure that the stranger 
was trustworthy and otherwise a good “fit” for the group.196  When the adoptive family 
was assured this was the case, the head of the family would intercede on the stranger’s 
behalf and ask for land (underutilized land had to be available).  Presumably, the adoptive 
family had its own reputation on the line in such a process and so would monitor 
strangers with special care.   Once an application for land was made, the chief would 
typically consent so long as: 
“(1) the stranger should be of good report, (2) he should be ready and willing to 
obey the accepted social norms of the adoptive group and (3) he should have 
respect for and loyalty to the head chief as well as the elders of the community.  
Land granted so granted is held by strangers in perpetuity in exactly the same way 
and subject to the like conditions of customary tenure as bind the members of the 
owner-occupiers themselves.”197
This process turned a stranger into a quasi-family member and encouraged the adopted 
person to align his or her expectations regarding the use and transfer of property with 
those of the group.198  One effect was lower transactions costs of group coordination, 
cooperation, resource allocation, and use.  Another effect was reduced future costs 
associated with monitoring and enforcing obligations.  
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This mechanism reduced transactions costs associated with dealing with heterogeneous 
agents.199 When the ability to engage in impersonal exchange is limited, this mechanism 
personalize property-rights trades.200  While the process is costly and slow, it is a step in 
the evolutionary process from personal to impersonal exchange.   The customary-law 
principle for dealing with strangers can thus be seen as a way for outsiders to develop a 
reputation for trustworthiness with an unfamiliar group.  This feature of the customary 
African law, while cumbersome, might have worked to solve the problem of increased 
heterogeneity while also managing to ensure better uses of  resources that were being 
underutilized.201
Preserving relative homogeneity, or inducing homogeneity, might have been an important 
strategy for these groups for several reasons.  First, groups with higher levels of 
homogeneity can coordinate production and other activity in a less costly manner than 
can more heterogeneous groups.202  For farmers working with rather primitive, labor-
intensive technology, low-cost coordination would be valuable.203  More homogeneous 
groups are able to cooperate at less cost than are heterogeneous groups.204  Individuals 
199 See Jürg Niehans, Transaction Costs, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS Vol. 4, 676 
(1987) who says:  “Transaction costs arise from the transfer of ownership or, more generally, of property 
rights.  They are a concomitant of decentralized ownership rights, private property and exchange.” See 
generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JOURNAL OF  LAW AND ECONOMICS 1-44 (1960. 
200 See Douglass C. North, NOBEL PRIZE LECTURE (1993) available at 
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html, DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990),and Kevin A. McCabe, Reciprocity and 
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within the group are likely to have repeated interactions with other group members.  They 
may generate higher levels of goodwill and trust each other more.205
Transactions costs incurred by the homogeneous group are low, compared to costs 
incurred by heterogeneous groups, because the homogeneous group can more effectively 
rely on social norms to promote compliance.206  Higher cooperation levels means that 
fewer resources are spent defining, monitoring, and enforcing property rights.  In Plateau, 
evidence from the 1930s and the 1960s suggests that violent conflict over property was 
relatively rare.207   Of particular interest is Robert Netting’s observations of the 
relationship between the Kofyar and Fulani herdsmen in the 1960s:
The pastoral Fulani did not have access to Plateau pastures until after British 
pacification and the eradication of the tsetse fly.   Several households now move 
up and down the Kofyar escarpment according to the season, and some others 
have settled in the lowlands.  Their milk products find little market among the 
beer-drinking Kofya, but individuals compete in offering money and services to 
induce Fulani to camp on and thus manure their fields.  With the exception of 
venturing freely to new farms on the plain and markets within a twenty-mile 
radius, Kofyar show little change in their tolerant relations with neighboring 
groups.  Few of the strangers in their territory enter into direct competition with 
the Kofyar, and those who do, such as the Tiv filtering north from the Benue, are 
merely regarded with mild suspicion.208
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As Libecap notes, however, when groups become heterogeneous and have a limited 
history of interaction, they may need to turn to more formalized government institutions 
to define and enforce these rights.209
The lengthy and costly process for inducing homogeneity through adoption may be 
contrasted to the short-term loan, which serves as a means for allowing heterogeneous 
individuals limited access to valuable resources. 210 Compared with long-term loans or 
sales of real property, the short-term loan might also have lower transactions costs, 
particularly when resources are relatively abundant.  The reason is that less is at stake.  
Parties to a short-term contract, therefore, likely spend fewer resources outlining rights 
and obligations.  Monitoring costs also are lower (because of the shorter length of the 
contract and the fact that the stakes aren’t very high).  These lower monitoring costs 
mean lower transaction costs.  Thus, in cases where problems of heterogeneity cannot 
easily be overcome -- such as most trades between animists and Muslims, Christians and 
Muslims, or Fulanis and Taroks -- the short-term loan under customary land law is a 
cost-effective contracting mechanism for trading property rights and reallocatin g a 
resource. 211
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This brings us to the problem of recent conflict in Plateau state.  In Plateau, population 
size is increasing at the same time that population heterogeneity is increasing.212   A rise 
in population size places additional demands on the resource of land, raising its value.  At 
the same time, increased heterogeneity leads to higher transactions costs when bargaining
for land rights.  In the absence of a viable enforcement mechanism, these costs escalate 
rapidly.  The combination of poorly enforced rights, increasing competition, and the 
increasing heterogeneity of actors might lead to fewer property-rights trades and more 
violence.213
As we have seen, the customary land law provided two methods for dealing with 
heterogeneous actors:  a) adoption or b) the short-term loan.  Until recently, herders used
the short-term loan of land to acquire rights to graze and water livestock.214  Such loans 
presented “no permanent loss of land to the customary owners.”215 These loans 
provided benefits to both parties to the transaction:  farmers had fields of stubble grazed 
and manured; herders had access to grazing grounds not otherwise open to them.  The 
benefits of the system were such that one commentator says:  “In the past 60 to 70 years 
relationships between herding and farming groups in the use of land for grazing and 
cultivation were generally friendly.”216
As the desert spreads southward, limiting grazing and watering opportunities, herders 
from the north are moving into Plateau presumably seeking more permanent rights to 
212 See, “Conflict in northern Nigeria more about land and livelihood than religion,” supra note 11.
213 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 23 at 49-52. 
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216
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such resources.217  At the same time, as the population of settled farmers increases, there 
is an increase in the demand for farmland.218 The two demands clash.  Under the 
customary law, these heterogeneous parties could turn to the short-term loan to allocate 
grazing and watering rights.  However, this kind of temporary solution might no longer 
be workable if the rising value of property gives short-term lessees incentives to breach 
the contract and remain on the land. 
In such situations, the customary-law mechanism of “adopting” strangers should come 
into play.  However, this customary mechanism, which worked effectively to incorporate 
small numbers of strangers, might simply be too cumbersome and too slow to incorporate 
larger groups of strangers.  As a result, we expect to see movement towards increased 
individualization of tenure, as the older mechanism proves incapable of managing the 
double shock of increasing population and increasing heterogeneity. In other words, we 
expect to see the customary law adopt and allow for increased use of the sale of property.  
However, this movement is blocked by the Land Use Act.  Furthermore, the Act itself 
likely promotes tenure insecurity.219  As the value of land increases, people holding 
insecure property rights will seek ways to make their rights more secure.  Indeed, under 
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the Land Use Act, herders have a special incentive to assert claims to property because, 
under the statute, they may seek rights to as many as 5,000 hectares of land, while 
farmers may only seek a maximum of 500 acres.220 Thus herders have an opportunity to 
capture a large share of the rents associated with rising property value in the Plateau area.
The Land Use Act might also limit opportunities for cooperative indigenous dispute 
resolution.  Previous institutional arrangements gave local leaders significant voice in 
dispute resolution over property rights.  The process created by the LUA allows a much 
more limited role for such leaders – that of providing evidentiary material.  This role is 
surely useful, however, it means that current decision makers are not accountable to the 
community in the way that a local leader would be.  Also, it is presumably, more difficult 
and costly to negotiate or renegotiate land-use rights in the form of certificates of 
occupancy with government officials, who have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis 
applicants and can thus hold out for bribes.  If this the hold- out problem is real, as 
Williams argues, then renegotiations in response to changes in the environment are also 
more costly and take place less frequently than they would under a customary regime.221
Government will normally provide increased clarification of property rights and 
enforcement when property values rise and heterogeneity increases.222  However, if 
government attempts to define and enforce rights fail, then people have few options other 
than to skirt formal de jure processes.  In Plateau, both settled farmers and incoming 
herders have insecure property rights under the current amalgamation of customary law 
220
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and land-use legislation.223 The value of the land around these groups is rising, so 
members of each seek to capture the rents associated with this rise in value, by excluding 
members of the other. Corrupt government institutions provide no real alternative for 
conflict resolution, and the older customary system might be unable to process this level 
of change.224 In such a situation, the cost of resorting to violence might be perceived as 
lower than the cost of negotiating a peaceful transfer of property rights.225
By formalizing and centralizing decision-making about land use and land occupancy, the 
Nigerian government blocked the continued evolutionary development of customary land 
law. The Act replaces indigenous dispute-resolution institutions with bureaucratized, 
corrupt government institutions.  Rather than rely on decentralized legal decision making, 
the Land Use Act creates a formalized and centralized system that is expensive for 
individuals to use.  This system, therefore, reduces experimentation in legal problem 
solving, and it leads to decreased jurisdictional competition. The system seems to be 
riddled with problems:   time-consuming process, costliness, corruption, favoritism, and 
inaccessibility for citizens living in rural areas.   
Legislation, such as the Land Use Act, might be less elastic and less responsive to 
community needs than the customary law because it is removed from individuals who 
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hold dispersed local knowledge of each dispute -- i.e., the disputants -- and the potential 
impacts of a variety of judgments. By taking land-use decision-making out of the hands 
of local leaders – representatives of homogeneous groups – the Land Use Act removes 
the incentives members of these groups develop to communicate knowledge, coordinate 
activities, and cooperate.   The Land Use Act, in effect, promotes the heterogenization of 
relations.  
The Act blocks the development of a market in land sales, forcing individuals to rely on 
government officials to allocate this resource.  This blockage limits development of 
impersonal exchange, and keeps property/land relations in a state of personal exchange 
but importantly, without the enforcement mechanisms that existed under customary law.   
Thus, the Land Use Act fails to solve problems associated with heterogeneous agents
while at the same time outlawing sale of land --   the contractual mechanism that is best 
suited for managing property-rights relations among such individuals.226
The result is that compared to the customary system, the Land Use Act increases 
transaction costs.  No longer can individuals and groups rely on social norms to ensure 
compliance with property rights.  Rather, individuals must rely on the state to define, 
monitor, and enforce these rights.  Significantly, however, the Nigerian state often fails in 
this essential function:  
“In light of the pattern of violence in Plateau State over recent months, with each 
community seeking to avenge attacks by their opponents, the latest outbreak 
should have come as no surprise to federal and state authorities,” said [Peter] 
Takirambudde* . . . `Yet the Nigerian government took no action to preempt the 
massacre. The government’s neglect of the situation in Plateau over the last three 
226
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years has resulted in an endless cycle of revenge,’ Takirambudde said. `Not only 
have the police been unwilling or unable to stop the fighting, but the government 
has not taken responsibility for finding a lasting solution to the crisis.’”227
*Executive Director, Human Rights Watch’s Africa Division
In Nigeria, the state is considered to be highly corrupt, and state officials often fail to 
enforce and protect property rights.228  The judiciary is not considered to be impartial.229
Because the public sector is so corrupt, individuals must rely more heavily on personal 
exchange and personal influence to accomplish their goals.  Such reliance might be more 
difficult in Nigeria because the old customary norms designed to smooth relations among 
individuals in dealings over land are superseded by the Land Use Act.  No longer are 
village headmen, chiefs, or obas able to facilitate the incorporation of outsiders into the 
group or make land-use decisions based on their local knowledge.  Yet, people do not 
have reliable access to government decision makers.  Thus, disputes over land allocation 
and land use issues may be left to individuals to resolve – and individuals might turn to 
violence as their only meaningful method for asserting property claims.
With regard to land, the Land Use Act places primary responsibility for managing the 
land-allocation decisions with state governors and, as Transparency International’s 2003
report on Nigeria states: “[A]lthough Nigeria is a federation of states, there has been 
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virtually no independent, anti-corruption effort by any of the states or by local 
government.”230  This situation bodes especially ill for land issues. 
Further, government courts might be less accessible – because they are viewed as corrupt, 
costly, and far away --  than customary courts.  These government courts might also be 
less transparent.  These problems are particularly difficult for the poor and less well 
educated to manage.  In a 2004 report on judicial integrity in Nigeria, the United National 
Office on Drugs and Crimes says: 
Significant differences were found regarding the experiences and perceptions of 
respondents with different socio-economic and demographic characteristics.  In 
particular the less privileged, both in terms of monetary means and educational 
background as well as the ethnic minorities tended to have worse experiences and 
perceptions of the justice system .  .  .  Further, the poor and uneducated were 
more likely to experience delays in justice delivery .  .  .  women, the poor as well 
as ethnic minorities experienced and perceived lower quality of justice delivery .  
.  .  ethnic minorities as well as the poor tended to have less trust in judiciary.231
As individuals face increasing conflict over land, they suffer from a costly system for 
resolving disputes over land.  Indeed, the system might well be perceived as so costly that 
individuals resort to violence in order to lay effective de facto claims to an increasingly 
valuable resource – land.232
Conclusion
At first glance the increased violence in Plateau State over property-rights allocations is 
puzzling.  Why, in the home of “Peace and Tourism,” are thousands of people dying 
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because of property disputes?   The recognition that changing conditions, both exogenous 
and endogenous, create incentives that perhaps lead people to resort to violence rather 
than peaceful trade, helps piece this puzzle together. An increasing, and increasingly 
heterogeneous, population is demanding access to a scarce resource -- land.  This rising 
demand raises land values.  It is more costly for the citizens of Plateau to come together
peacefully to trade these rights because of the increased transaction costs associated with 
greater heterogeneity and because the institutional process for trading rights, created by 
the Land Use Act, is also costly.  These problems, coupled with tenure insecurity and 
poor enforcement of rights might lead to lower levels of peaceful trade and, in turn, 
increased violence.   
The Land Use Act significantly restricts individual’s abilities to trade property rights in 
land.  Even if peaceful trade does take place, as it no doubt does, there remains a risk that 
such rights might be taken by predatory private or public action.  The result is increased 
insecurity of tenure.  Not only is there increased tenure insecurity in Plateau, there is a 
failure of the state government to enforce rights and to manage violence associated with 
violations of rights.  
The result is that the Land Use Act has blocked legal evolution that would normally 
allow for greater individualization of tenure rights in Plateau state.  People cannot buy 
and sell land in a decentralized market place, they can only legally acquire and transfer 
rights through a political process that is deeply corrupted.  The result is that as certain 
land in Plateau becomes more valuable, because of internal migrations and increasing 
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population, citizens face extremely costly process for establishing rights in land.  This 
paper suggests that these costs might now be so high that people are foregoing the 
mechanisms of the Land Use Act, opting instead to take the law into their own hands in 
an attempt to establish rights by private force.  Unless and until the incentive structure 
regarding the transfer of land rights in Plateau (and throughout Nigeria) is changed to 
promote peaceful transfer over violence, the problems of Yelwa and Jos are likely to 
continue.   Nigeria’s leaders should take Robert Cooter’s advice into consideration as 
they ponder how to return Plateau to its previously peaceful state:  
Central authorities should aim for the modest goals of removing obstacles to 
economic opportunity, rather than trying to dictate the pace and direction of 
development .  .  .  Uncertainty over property rights can only be removed through 
the evolution of customary law and the registration of customary boundaries.233
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